HPAVC/HPAVC CD-ROM.iso/pc/HOMEWORK.ZIP/IRAN.TXT

Text File | 1998-07-25 | 25.1 KB | 420 lines

Language: English
Subject: History
Title: Iranian Revolution
Grade: 88%
System: High school
Age: 16 years old (when handed in)
Country: USA
Comments:   A  good  essay  describing  in  detail  the   Iranian
Revolution using Crane Brinton's theory.  About 18 pages.


Content-ID: <[e-mail].60089>
Content-type: text/plain;
    name="Cheat2"
      Iran  is  a country located in the Middle East.   The  main
source of income for the country is oil, the one object that  had
greatly influenced its history.  Iran's present government is run
as  an  Islamic Republic.  A president, cabinet, judicial branch,
and  Majilesor  or legislative branch, makes up the  governmental
positions.   A revolution that overthrew the monarch,  which  was
set  in  1930,  lasted over 15 years.  Crane Brinton's  book,  An
Anatomy  of  a Revolution, explains set of four steps  a  country
experiences  when a revolution occurs.  Symptoms,  rising  fever,
crisis,  and convalescence are the steps that occur.  The Iranian
Revolution  followed  the four steps in Crane  Brinton's  theory,
symptoms, rising fever, crisis, and convalescence occurred.
     Numerous symptoms led to the crumbling downfall of Reza Shah
Pahlavi,  ruler  of  Iran until 1978.  One of these  symptoms  is
rising expectations which can be seen during the 1960's and 70's.
The rich Shah cleared the way for the land reform law, enacted in
1962.   The  land  minority  had to  give  up  its  land  to  the
government,  and  among those stripped of land, were  the  Shi'ah
Muslims.   Iran's  power  structure was radically  changed  in  a
program termed the "White Revolution".  On January 26, 1963,  the
White Revolution was endorsed by the nation.  By 1971, when  land
distribution  ended,  about  2,500,000  families  of   the   farm
population   benefited  from  the  reforms.   From  1960-72   the
percentage of owner occupied farmland in Iran rose from 26 to  78
percent.   Per capita income rose from $176 in 1960 to $2,500  in
1978.   From  1970-77 the gross national product was reported  to
increase to an annual rate of 7.8% ("Iran" 896).  As a result  of
this thriving economy, the income gap rapidly widened.  Exclusive
homes,  extravagant  restaurants, and  night  clubs  and  streets
loaded with expensive automobiles served as daily reminders of  a
growing  income  spread.  This created a perfect environment  for
many conflicts to arise between the classes.
      Iran's  elite  class  consisted  of  wealthy  land  owners,
intelligencia, military leaders, politicians, and diplomats.  The
Elite  continued  to support the monarchy  and  the  Shah.    The
peasants  were  victim  of  unfulfilled  political  expectations,
surveillance  by  the secret police, and the  severe  social  and
economic  problems that resulted from modernization.  The  middle
class  favored  socialism over capitalism, because capitalism  in
their  view supported the elite, and does not benefit  the  lower
classes.  The middle class was the most changeable element in the
group,  because they enjoyed some of the privileges of the elite,
which  they  would  like  to protect.  At  the  same  time,  they
believed  that they had been cheated by the elite  out  of  their
share of the industrialization wealth (Orwin 43).
      About this time, the middle class, which included students,
technocrats, and modernist professionals, became discontent  with
the  economy.   The key event should have further stabilized  the
royal dictatorship, but the increase in oil prices and oil income
beginning in 1974 caused extreme inflation.  This was due to  the
investment  strategy  followed  by  the  Shah,  which  led  to  a
spectacular 42% growth rate in 1974. (Cottam 14).  And because of
the  Shah's  support  structure which enabled  the  new  rich  to
benefit  from  inflation,  the government  effort  to  deal  with
inflation was aimless.  Poor Iranians and Iranians with  a  fixed
income suffered major losses in real income.  Better standards of
living were no longer visible.  Thus, the majority of the Iranian
people developed a revolutionary predisposition.
     As the middle class became discontent in Iran throughout the
1970's,  the desertion of intellectuals could be found  in  great
excess.   Ayatollah  Ruhollah Khomeini represented  much  of  the
discontent  of  the religious sector of Iran.  For  speaking  out
against the Shah's autocratic rule, Khomeini was exiled to Turkey
in  1963.   In 1965, Khomeini moved to Iraq where he  became  the
central  spokesperson for expatriate opposition to the Shah.   On
October  6,  1978, Khomeini was expelled from Iraq and  moved  to
Paris,  where  he was accessible to a larger body  of  opposition
forces.   He was also accessible to the Western Press.   Khomeini
preached   that  he  would  displace  the  Shah  and  expel   the
foreigners.   He  also  said  he  would  enforce  religious   and
traditional  values, and redirect Iran's wealth away  from  large
industrialization schemes and toward reforms needed by the common
people.    Throughout  the  1970's,  Khomeini  gained  tremendous
popularity  with  the masses, and he became  the  symbol  of  the
opposition towards the Shah.
     As Khomeini gained popularity, many religious groups grew in
numbers and in status.  In the early 1950's, the technocrats  had
showed  core  support for Mohammad Mossedeq and  Iran's  national
movement.   They saw Mossadeq's overthrow as the removal  of  the
symbolic  leader  of the Iranian nation by an  American  directed
coup  d'etat.  Many of his followers formed groups in  opposition
to  the  Shah.  Leaders of the Freedom Front, one of  the  groups
that grew out of the Mossadeq movement, were a group composed  of
intellectuals  who  tended  to be centrist  in  philosophy,  more
religious,   anti-Marxist,  and  militant  (Cottam   13).    They
recognized  Khomeini's large and potentially enormous  following,
and associated themselves with him
      The rise of religious opposition groups and Khomeini proved
to be a great test for the Shah.  As time progressed the weakness
of  the Shah became apparent.  Waves of opposition began building
after  1975,  due to the formation of the Rastakhiz ,  the  legal
political  party in Iran, and the banning of opposition political
parties.   It  also became clear that the increased oil  revenues
following   oil  price  increases,  were  spent   on   arms   and
industrialization.   In  mid-1977  the  religious  leaders  began
demonstrating against the modernization brought on by  the  Shah.
In  November,  several people were killed when  police  broke  up
demonstrations.  As time went on, protests became  more  radical.
To try and quiet dissent, the Shah became more of a dictator.  As
a  result,  those  who had been moderate in  demands  for  reform
became  more  radical.  In the fall of 1978, strikes against  the
oil  industry, the post office, government factories,  and  banks
demolished  the economy.  This pattern continued throughout  most
of 1978 (Orwin 45).  As these protests became more frequent there
were  more and more people killed.  This reflects the Shah's loss
of power over his government and his people.
      In late 1978, the Shah came to the conclusion that he would
and  could  not rule a country in which he had to  stand  in  the
flowing  blood  of his people.  In short, he understood  that  he
could  not  militarily occupy his own country.  The Shah's  early
mistakes had been devastating as the years went on.  His forceful
actions  did  not work and it's no wonder that his grip  weakened
and his mid wavered.
      These events all led to the march against the government of
the  Shah, in which eight million Iranians protested on  December
10,  1978  (Bill  25).  One-fifth of the Iranian  government  was
willing  to  join  in a massive and nonviolent  manifestation  of
opposition even though most of them knew that thousands of  their
countrymen had been shot in previous demonstrations.  The banners
and slogans made clear the religious and political essence of the
revolutionary  movement.   This  massive  demonstration  was  the
turning   point  from  symptoms  to  rising  fever.   It  clearly
reflected  the  weakness of the Shah, and  the  inevitability  of
revolution in Iran.
      After a year of public demonstrations against him, the Shah
of  Iran  left  Tehran  on  January 16, 1979,  for  an  "extended
vacation"  (Orwin 46).  He left the country in  the  hands  of  a
regency  council and Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar, who  was  a
former member of the National Front.
      The  opposition  leader, Khomeini, was to  become  the  new
ruler,  and  he  returned to Iran on February 1, 1979.   Khomeini
occupied   preeminent  positions  among  Iran's  most   respected
religious  scholars, the Mujahedin-e Khalq..   Although  Khomeini
wanted  a stable government that could cope with the problems  of
reconstruction, he wanted to eradicate the evil roots of the  old
system,  which  he  describes  as  satanic.   He  denounced   the
materialism of the recent past and called for a climate in  which
social justice would prevail.
      On  April 1, 1979, after a landslide victory in a  national
referendum, Khomeini declared an Islamic republic.  This republic
consisted  of a new constitution reflecting Khomeini's ideals  of
Islamic  government.  He was named Iran's political and religious
leader for life.  Khomeini tapped the deep-seated conservatism of
the Muslim fundamentalists by making moderate changes in the law.
Women  were required to wear the veil, Western music and  alcohol
were  banned, and the punishments described by Islamic  law  were
reinstated.  Political vengeance was taken, executing hundreds of
people who had worked with the Shah's regime ("Iran" 897).
      The large moderate center composed of the professional  and
bourgeois  middle  class had proved to be  ineffective  in  their
leadership abilities.  Moderate Bakhtiar, the last prime minister
under  Pahlavi  rule, was very unpopular, and he  was  unable  to
compromise  with  his former National Front  colleagues  or  with
Khomeini.  He was then forced to flee to France.
      On  April  1,  1979,  his replacement, Mehdi  Bazergan  was
appointed by Khomeini (Cottam 15).  This 73-year-old engineer was
a  leader of the Freedom Front, and president of the committee of
human  rights.   The  middle and upper middle classes  looked  to
Bazergan  to  provide stability so the economy would recover  and
the government services could be restored.  Bazergan appointed  a
cabinet,  mainly,  from  the  ranks of  the  Freedom  Front,  the
National   Front,  and  the  religious  bureaucracy.   Bazergan's
position  was weak, however, and he steadily lost ground  to  the
due to the attacks from the far right and left.  As their base of
support narrowed, their dependence on Khomeini intensified.
     During this time, Iran's relation with the US went downhill.
It  reached a stage of outright confrontation, when, on  November
4,  1979, 500 extremist students seized the US embassy in Tehran.
They  took  hostage 66 citizens at the embassy  and  the  foreign
ministry  ("The Iranian Revolution" 835).  The takeover seemingly
sanctioned  by  Khomeini, continued for the next  444  days,  and
American-Iranian relations sunk to an all-time low.  This led  to
trade  conflicts  with the United States and its allies,  causing
economic problems.
      During the rising fever stage there is a presence of a dual
government.   During  Bazergan's rule,  it  became  difficult  to
administer justice with a court system that had been particularly
lenient  to  the royal will.  To deal with these  problems  on  a
temporary  basis.   Khomeini  set up a  system  of  revolutionary
committees  presided over by a revolutionary council.   Religious
leaders   clearly  predominated  in  the  revolutionary  council-
committee-courts  system, which came  to  be  almost  a  parallel
government.
      In  November,  1979, Bazergan resigned, and  in  his  place
Khomeini  appointed  Abol Hassan Bani Sadr.   Bani  Sadr  was  an
idealist,  a bookworm, and most personally ambitious of  all  the
liberal  revolutionaries.  Like the other  moderates,  he  was  a
representative of the professional middle class, who  had  little
skill  or patience to build political organizations.  Bani Sadr's
efforts  were  fruitless in dealing with  the  hostage  releases.
After  being elected Iran's first president in January  1980,  he
and his followers, out of self defense and desperation, formed an
alliance  with  the  Mujahedin-e Khalq  ("Iran"  897).   He  also
attempted  to  work  hard to establish close relations  with  the
military  leaders.   He  ineffectively tried  to  appeal  to  the
Iranian  people,  who had little in common with a  Paris  trained
intellectual.   One  can see that during  this  stage  of  rising
fever,  moderate  control is losing power.  The  people  of  Iran
became  upset with the little change that was taking  place,  and
wanted more extreme measures taken.
      In  mid-1981, leaders of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP)
convinced Khomeini that Bani Sadr was plotting against them,  and
suggested  evidence  indicating that  he  was  a  threat  to  the
revolution.  This led to his dismissal on June 20, of position of
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.  His presidency lasted 17
months.   He was arrested and dismissed as president on June  22.
Forced  into  hiding,  he fled Iran on July  29,  1981,  and  was
granted  political  asylum  in  Paris.   On  July  24,  extremist
Muhammad  Ali  Rajai  with  substantial  IRP  backing,  won   the
electoral victory over the moderates.  Thus, the period of rising
fever ended, and the period of crisis began.
     In 1981, Khomeini took complete control over Iran and took
many extremist measures.  He made sure the government completely
controlled the media, as well as newspapers, television
broadcasts, and radio programs.  He had strict control of
everything, including the treasury and flow of money to religious
leaders.  Those who disagreed with him faced severe economic
retribution.  The crisis had begun and radicals had taken over.
     Under Khomeini's rule (1981-1989) came a great period of
reign of terror.  For example, after a speech the Ayatollah made,
right wing revolutionary guards fired into a rally of
approximately one hundred thousand Muslim leftists outside the
U.S. Embassy in Teheran.  Five people were killed and more than
300 were wounded.  Supporters held food riots in Tunisia, and
others held six car bombings in Kuwait.  The Islamic Jihad held
suicide bombings that killed two hundred-forty one U.S.
Servicemen, and fifty-eight French troops in Beirut.  These acts
were not looked at as being bad acts of terrorism, but rather as
acts of patriotic heroes.  The reign of terror, the next step in
the crisis, brought extremists into complete control.
     The people of Iran in the early 1980's, had just about
enough of all these laws and regulations, and were outraged at
their standard of living.  People were finally starting to revolt
against the way that they have been treated.  This period
according to Crane Brinton, is known as the civil war.  Civil war
started in Iran with the conflict with the Kurds.  These people
were pushed out of their homes, religious temples, and places of
business, because of the overpowering radicals.  An entire
religious group was almost completely annihilated because of the
savage behavior of the radicals.  It was later found that the
Kurdish problem was merely a pretext on Iran's part to engage in
meetings and collaborations with two influential middle eastern
states, Turkey and Syria.  People suffered so that government
could gain allies.  The poor treatment of the Kurds led to
confusion in the nation.
     Because of all of the chaos in the country, due to different
public demonstrations and mass rioting, government groups were
forming.  The IRP, one of these groups, was in support of a
nationalistic movement.  Opposed to it was the Hojatieh, and a
third party, which represented the Mullahs and the high
ayatollahs.  This third group thought Khomeini was reckless, so
there was great hostility towards the IRP.  These groups formed
different factions among the people of Iran, and led to a divided
nation.
     In the early 1980's,  patriotic fever was bordering on
hysteria, and the nationalism was incredible.  This patriotic
fever fits in to the next part of the revolution, the republic of
virtue.  Iran's people had a great sense of nationalism inside of
them.  People held many parades and marches to express their
nationalism.  During this time, women were forced to wear veils
in public, modern divorce laws were repealed, and harsh courts
were set up, which set strict laws and harsh penalties.
     The colliding views of the Iranian groups, as well as the
republic of virtue, made it hard for Iran to deal with other
countries.  During this period, Iran's relationship with Iraq
became troubled.  The war began with a fight for land and oil and
as a result of the personalities of the two leaders.  Both
Hussein, the leader of Iraq, and Khomeini are headstrong.  In
addition, they disliked each other (Orwin 42).
     All of the circumstances that resulted from the war may have
contributed in some measure to the outbreak and continuation of
the conflict between Iran and Iraq (Iran-Iraq War  77-78).  The
situation worsened in September of 1980 when Iraq launched an
attack on Iran to take control of the waterway that divided the
two countries ("Iranian Revolution"  p. 835).
     During the war, industry suffered.  Chemical, steel, and
iron plants in the war zone were heavily shelled.  There have
been shortages in electricity, fuel, and spare parts.  The
available pool of workers has diminished as thousands of men
marched off to the front lines to fight.  This caused great
economic problems throughout the mid-1980's.  Iraq attempted to
devastate oil economy even further.  Tankers and ships 50 miles
off the oil terminal were struck.  Iran would be deprived of a
major source of income (Orwin 41).
     By 1984 it was reported that there were one million refuges
in the Iranian province of Khuzestan.  Some 300,000 Iranian
soldiers and 250,000 Iraqi troops had been killed, or wounded.
Among the injured were Iranian soldiers who sustained burns,
blisters, and lung damage from Iraqi chemical weapons (Orwin 47).
The war lasted about 8 years and Iran suffered casualties, not
only in people, but in economy and leadership as well.
     Because of the war with Iraq, and the purges going on in
Iran, the economy was severely depressed.  Besides the enormous
human cost, economic losses from the war exceed $200 billion.
Agricultural growth has declined as a result of war, also (Orwin
34).
     During the crisis and during the war with Iraq, industry is
plagued by poor labor management, a lack of competent technical
and managerial personnel, and shortages of raw material and spare
parts.  Agricultural suffers from shortage of capital, raw
materials, and equipment, and as a result, food production has
declined.  Also, out of an estimated work force of 12 million,
unemployment is up to 3-4 million (Orwin 16).  Iran's economy was
desperate.
     In connection with the devastating economy with the war,
there was economic suffering through purges, the next step in
crisis.  Extensive purges were carried out in the army, in the
school and university systems, and in some of the departments of
government although the Ministries of Justice and Commerce proved
significantly more resistant because of the entrenched power of
conservative elements there).  Additionally, new institutions
were created, like the Revolutionary Guards - including the
creation of a ministry for them - and the counsel of Guardians,
along with a string of other judicial bodies (Akhavi  53).
Purges eliminated many qualified personnel, and lowered the
morale of the Iranian people.
     Finally, after about 9 years of crisis and fighting among
different groups, there was a breakthrough in the revolution,
with the return of conservatives.  The Ayatollah Khomeini died in
May of 1989, and a new leader by the name of Ali Hashemi
Rafsanjani was elected and came to power two months later.  This
would start the convalescence stage of Crane Brinton's
revolution.  Rafsanjani has not actually called for a reversal of
strict Islamic injunctions, but in oblique ways he is signaling
that he favors a more relaxed approach, especially in the
enforcement of the hijab (Ramazani 7).
     Under Rafsanjani, the return of the church has been allowed
to occur, which is another step in the theory of a revolution.
On August 2, 1991, Iran resumed diplomatic relations with Iraq
and had also resolved the issue over the pilgrimage of Iranian
Muslims to Mecca, which has been suspended for three years.
Inside Iran, the most significant development in the last few
months took place in October, when several Iranian leaders teamed
up in a maneuver to marginalize opponents (Igram  A-10).
     Twelve years after Khomeini came to power, Iran's Islamic
revolution has finally softened around the edges.  The signs of
fitful change are everywhere.  On Tehran's streets women still
observe hijab (the veil), the Islamic injunction that women keep
themselves covered except for their faces and hands.  But some
have exchanged their shapeless black chedors for slightly fitted
raincoats in colors like green and purple.  Women's fingernails
are starting to sport glosses, too (Ramazani  32).  Obviously,
the republic of virtue has been eliminated, which is the next
part in the convalescence.
      After  Khomeini's death, many radical groups were weakened.
This  led  to the elimination of radicals.  President Rafsanjani,
with the support of Khomeini, swiftly eliminated four of his most
hard-line  adversaries from the political  scene  by  challenging
their right to re-election.  With Rafsanjani in control, Iranians
took  a  new look at crisis.  His pragmatic policies were  firmly
established,  replacing  militancy  and  isolation.    Rafsanjani
campaigned  to  decrease  the influence of  important  opponents,
therefore  improving ties with the western  world.   As  well  as
attracting  foreign trade.  The radicals were finally eliminated,
and Iran could return to the way it was.
      Economic  problems after a revolution are good.   Iran  had
been  in  debt  from  the  time the revolution  started,  and  an
economic  recovery  was needed.  There was  an  increase  in  oil
revenue  in  1990, since ties with non-oil bearing countries  had
been replaced.  There was also and increase in oil price, as well
as  other raw materials.  Iran did have ten billion dollars froze
in  American banks, which still partly remain there  today.   The
country's economic problems were starting to be resolved.
      The  return  of  status  quo, is  the  final  step  in  the
convalescence stage.  Iran has returned to the status quo.   They
have  many  ties, including ties with North Korea, Libya,  Syria,
and Europe.  Trade and friendliness has increased with Russia, as
well.   Russia currently want to build nuclear reactors in  Iran.
Commerce  opened  with  Japan, Pakistan, Turkey,  and  even  some
allies of Iraq.  Rafsanjani wants to end Iran's pariah status  in
the  world community and gain desperately needed aid.  He  thinks
they are in a period of reconstruction (Desmond 32).
      The Iranian Revolution is over, and the country is back  on
its  feet.  Rafasanjani was an incredible help to the economy and
the  government, and remains in power today.  Iran  has  a  great
number  of allies, which improves its ties with the west.  Iran's
oil  industry  is  booming,  and the  country's  economy  remains
stable.  Americans are again allowed to be seen on the streets of
Tehran,  and  the foreign debt has reduced.  The U.S.  still  has
their  problems  with Iran (the money in the  banks),  but  these
problems  are  still in the process of being resolved.   Iran  is
progressing steadily, and has recovered from the revolution.  The
Iranian Revolution follows Crane Brinton's theory on a revolution
because  the revolution included symptoms, rising fever,  crisis,
and convalescence, just as the theory states.

                           Works Cited
Akhavi, Shahrough.  "Institutionalizing New Order in Iran."
     Current History.  Feb. 1987:  53-56, 83.
Bill, James A.  "The Shah, The Ayatollah, and the U.S."  The
     Economist.  June 1987:  24-26.
Cottam, Richard W.  "Revolutionary Iran."  Current History.  Jan.
     1980:  12-16, 35.
Ibram, Youssef.  "Standoff in the Gulf:  Testing the Waters in
     Tehran."  The New York Times.
"Iran."  The New Encyclopedia Britanica.  Vol. 21  1992:  860-
     861, 896-897.
 Orwin, George.  Iran Iraq:  Nations at War.  New York:  Shirmer
     Books, 1990.
Ramazani, R.K.  "Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Persian Gulf."
     Current History.  Jan. 1985:  5-8, 32.
 "The Iranian Revolution."  People and Nations.  Austin:  Holt,
     Rinehart and Winston, Inc.  1993.